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Executive Summary. Uruguay has been at the forefront of Latin America in the reform the financial
system, making the first remarkable liberalization effort in 1974. This effort involved the elimination
of interest rate controls, credit constraints and the development of market–oriented policies. In spite
of the fact that markets were relatively free and open, private bonds and equities remained irrelevant
in the local market, and firms resorted to self financing or banking loans. The outcome has been an
underdeveloped bonds market. To understand the real determinants of this situation in order to find
the most efficient policy measures to remove the growth restrictions became even more relevant after
last systemic banking crisis of 2002.
The purpose of this work is to analyze the level of development of the Uruguayan capital markets and
their present determinants in order to make policy recommendations that will promote bond made
development. The main hypothesis that will be tested is that the Uruguayan bond market shows
financial fragilities and that the legal and institutional framework must be stronger in order to develop
the capital market. The methodology developed to evaluate this hypothesis will be the construction
of two indicators: the Financial Fragility Index (FFI) and the Legal and Institutional Framework Index
(LIFI). By crossing both indicators it is possible to identify different «development zones» for bond market
classification. It would be, also, a methodological contribution to evaluate the bond market from a
more comprehensive perspective.
The main results show that even though the Uruguayan bond market has improved its situation over
the last ten years it still remains in the underdevelopment zone. New market instruments and structure,
the changes in the legal system including a new bankruptcy law as well as the regional integration
should be key issues in the seek of bond market development.
Key words:
Resumen. Uruguay ha estado a la vanguardia de las reformas financieras en Latinoamérica, habien-
do comenzado sus primeras reformas en 1974. Estas políticas tendían a la eliminación de los contro-
les de tasa de interés, restricciones crediticias y al desarrollo del mercado de capitales. A pesar de
conformarse un mercado de capitales abierto y libre, las empresas continuaron buscando el financia-
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I. Introduction
Uruguay has been at the forefront in the
reform of the financial system in Latin America.
Financial liberalization was one of the main
policies in the 1970s, which involved the
elimination of interest rate controls, credit
constrains and the development of market-
oriented policies. The 1982 banking crisis
resulted in the renewal of financial repression
and hyperinflation, which ended up in a highly
dollarized economy. In this context, the public
sector was the main issuer of the local bond
market and even issued part of its debt in
foreign markets. After a short past experience,
private bonds and equities remained irrelevant
in the local market, and firms resorted to self
financing or bank loans.
In the early 1990s new efforts took place to
liberalize the financial system, and a new set
of structural reforms started. In 1994 a new law
for capital markets was approved, introducing
a new debt instrument for the private sector
called «obligaciones negociables». This bond
was regulated in order to improve tax treat-
ment and legal claim rights. In 1996 the Social
Security system was reformed, creating the
pension funds that were called to be one of the
main institutional investors in the country.
However, in 1998 the failure of one firm broke
the financial disintermediation process and
caused a withdrawal of demanders for private
debt and a return to bank financing. Therefore,
the private sector showed only brief high
activity periods in the stock exchange, in
relation to the economic booms or new
regulation that provides an easier access to
financial support. All these initiatives finished
with failures in private contracts and confirmed
the existence of monitoring problems on
dealing with moral hazard.1 In 2002, the
Uruguayan capital market suffered another
systemic banking crisis. The crisis resulted in the
renegotiation of the public debt and the
creation of the Indexed Unit (IU). This unit is
indexed to the inflation rate as a way of
changing the denomination of public debt and
as a part of the reversal of the dollarization
process.
In a moment of financial distress and bank
credit restrictions, underdeveloped capital
market financing channels cannot provide an
alternative to bank intermediation. Although the
new financial instrument has been regulated (i.e:
miento bancario o el autofinanciamiento, lo que provocó un mercado de deuda poco desarrollado.
Comprender los factores subyacentes de esta situación y encontrar medidas políticas más eficientes
se ha vuelto una cuestión aún más importante a la luz de la última crisis bancaria del año 2002.
El propósito de este trabajo es analizar el grado de desarrollo del mercado de capitales uruguayo
para proponer políticas que tiendan a desarrollarlo. El principal objetivo es desarrollar un test sobre
las hipótesis de fragilidad financiera del mercado de deuda y sobre la estructura legal e institucional
que debe adquirir el mercado de valores para desarrollarse. La metodología empleada para probar
estas hipótesis es la construcción de dos indicadores: el índice de fragilidad financiera (IFF) y el indi-
ce de estructura legal e institucional (IELI). A través de la interacción de ambos indicadores es posi-
ble identificar diferentes «zonas de desarrollo» para clasificar el mercado de capitales, lo que permite
clasificar el mercado de una forma más comprensiva.
El resultado muestra que, a pesar de haber mejorado su situación en los últimos diez años, el merca-
do de capitales uruguayo aún se encuentra en la zona de subdesarrollo. La aparición de nuevos ins-
trumentos, cambios en el plano legal —incluyendo la ley de bancarrota— y la integración regional
pueden ser las claves para promover su desarrollo.
Palabras clave: finanzas, mercados de capitales, reformas estructurales
1 Diamond (1984) and Diamond (1991).
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trust instrument called «fideicomiso financie-
ro») the domestic bond market does not seem
to be ready to play a prominent role on the
financial activity. Why is this private bond
market underdeveloped? Will public bond
market recuperate? These are key questions
our research aims to face.
The purpose of this work is to analyze the
level of development of Uruguayan capital
markets and its present determinants in order
to made policies recommendations to promote
bond made development. The main hypothesis
that will be tested is that the Uruguayan bond
market shows financial fragilities and that the
legal and institutional framework must be
stronger to develop the capital market. The
methodology developed to evaluate this
hypothesis will be the construction of two
indicators: the Financial Fragility Index (FFI) and
the Legal and Institutional Framework Index
(LIFI). By crossing both indicators will be
determined different «development zones» to
make the bond market classification. This
methodology will allow us to know how the
Uruguayan bond market has changed through-
out the last ten years s well as its current
situation.
The rest of the document is structured as
follows. Section Two presents a general
description of the Uruguayan bond market
data and a proposed methodology to evaluate
its development level. Section Three analyzes
the main determinants of the current market
situation. Finally, section Four summarizes
some policy recommendations.
II. The Uruguayan case:
Riding the ups and downs
of an underdeveloped market
II.1. Overview
Since the beginning of the 20th century, the
Uruguayan capital market was led by one
institution: the Montevideo Stock Exchange
(MSE).2 The government did not control this
self-regulated institution. In 1994, banks
created the Electronic Stock Exchange, which
competes with the former by concentrating
market operations of banks and another
institutional investors owned by the same
investors. In 1996 a new law was promulgated3,
creating a new organization, a Capital Market
Control Office as a part of Central Bank. By this
law, not only stocks exchange but also financial
instruments were subject to different standards
and controls. At the same time, the pension
reform created the private pension funds that
were allowed to be invested in private
instruments with specific characteristics: public
information and investment grade rating.
Moreover, rating agencies were regulated
under a registration policy at the Capital Market
Control Office.
In this context, conditions in the capital
market changed dramatically over the last ten
years. In spite of such changes, the capital
market remains underdeveloped. Following
the hypotheses analyzed by Eichengreen and
Luegnaruemitchai (2004) to explain Asia’s bond
market underdevelopment, some similarities
can be found with the Uruguayan case. Banks
have dominated the financial market, and
family connections seem to be very important
in the financial relationship. Uruguay is a small
country, which presumably made it difficult for
the development of the bond market. Legal
tradition is difficult to change in order to clarify
bondholder’s rights. The openness of the
economy and the depth of the dollarization
process limit the market for domestic-currency-
denominated securities. Even when domestic-
currency-denominated bonds are issued,
expectations are influenced by the exchange
rate risk resulting in short-term debt securities.
In order to show how the market worked,
section II.2 presents the market data that will
be necessary to describe bond market
development, pointing out the main aspects
of the different sectors’ issues and those of data.
2 Bolsa de Valores de Montevideo.
3 Law 16.749.
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Section II.3 introduces the methodology to
evaluate market development
II.2. Debt Market data
A brief description will be presented in
order to highlight the main information for the
Uruguayan case. Data sources were: the
Montevideo Stock Exchange reports4, the
Electronic Stock Exchange report5, as well as
the Public Register of Capital Market and
Banking Control Reports (both from the Central
Bank of Uruguay)6.
II.2.1. Private Sector Debt
Private sector securities market operates
with three different instruments: stocks, bonds
and time deposit certificates. Only a few firms
list their equities in the stock exchange market.
The outstanding amount of private sector
equities in December 2004 reached U$S 348.89
millions (2.64% GDP).
At the same time, private sector bonds
remain underdeveloped, reaching only a total
outstanding of U$S 189.22 millions (1,43% GDP).
At present, only nine firms have bonds in the
market, and many of them have negotiated
new conditions after the 2002 crisis. In the past,
three bonds were issued abroad, only one of
which remains at present, the rest were issued
domestically. In 2004, the improvement in the
economic performance (GDP increased 12.3%
in real terms) is reflected in the securities
market. Two firms issued new bonds for U$S
22.95 millions. In addition, a new trust law was
created in that year. However, in 2004 only
state-owned firms have issued such
instruments by U$S 197 millions.
Time deposit certificates are issued by
banks and mainly acquired by pension funds.
This instruments have short-term maturities,
and in 2004, the primary issuance reached an
amount of U$S 723.53 millions.
II.2.2. Public Sector Debt
Since the early nineties, 99% of the market
share is public sector securities. These include
treasury bills and bonds, global bonds, euro-
bonds and government enterprise bonds.
Different issuing strategies are used by the
public sector: treasury bills have weekly
auctions to determine the interest rate, both
in dollars and in pesos, and have short term
maturities; treasury bonds are denominated in
dollars (recently also in Indexed Unit) and have
long term maturities; global bonds and euro-
bonds are issued abroad in various currencies
(dollar, yen, pesos chilenos, pesos uruguayos
indexed). Main institutional investors (banks,
brokers and pension funds) acquire not only
domestically issued bonds but also international
bonds.
Public bond transaction reached U$S 712
millions in 2000, falling abruptly after the 2002
crisis. In February 2005 the outstanding public
debt in securities represents U$S 7,453.26
millions (56.42% of GDP)7.
II.2.3. Bond market structure
Since 1997 the Central Bank regulates rating
agencies registration, operation and
information. There are seven rating agencies
registered, and three of them are international
rating agencies established in the country.
Investment-grade rating is mandatory for
pension funds interested in investing in
privately issued bonds. Banks give clearing and
settlement domestic services. The Montevideo
Stock Exchange provides these services to its
members through a private bank. For pension
funds, the Central Bank of Uruguay plays the
role of securities depositary, although no
national securities depositary exists.
4 Montevideo Stock Exchange Memo.
5 This information exists since its creation in 1994.
6 This information is available from the creation of Capital
Market Control Office in 1996 until the present. 7 GDP value for 2004 reached U$S 13,214.77 millions.
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Government policies tend to create a
market, and in this sense all pension funds
operations must be done in the stock exchange
under a strict sanctionatory regime. Before the
2002 crisis, the access to bank credit seemed
to be lower than market cost for small and
medium size firms. After the crisis, the bank
credit has been restricted. However, as it was
mentioned above, only a few firms issued
bonds in this period.
II.2.4. Laws and institution
In Uruguay, bankruptcy laws are not well
developed for bonds holders. There are not
preferences between other holders. However,
the recent bankruptcy law for banks tends to
change to a faster process. Unfortunately, it was
not extended to corporations’ bankruptcy.
When issuing bonds, firms are committed
to giving corporate and statutory information
of the company, financial information, contract
conditions and draft prospectus which contains
all the information necessary for investors,
members of the Board of directors and control
authorities. This information is part of the Public
Register of Capital Market in the Central Bank
of Uruguay. Since 2000, the Central Bank
requires a compulsory rating (and its updates)
for new issuances over U$S 3 millions.
II.2.5. Banking system
The banking system is the principal financial
alternative in Uruguay. Although it has been
one of the first Latin-American countries that
went through the financial liberalization
process, the lack of appropriate controls on the
financial system remains an issue8. Addressing
the impacts of dollarization on the banking
system and risk control is a key topic on
improving financial strategies. The existence of
a big state-owned bank (almost the only
national bank) tends to limit competition in the
banking sector, which affects the cost of
financial intermediation, and makes the
analysis of its determinants difficult. The survey
will be useful in finding an explanation for the
fundamentals of interest rate spreads by
addressing firms’ preferences for bank credit.
II.3. Market evaluation methodology
Two hypotheses will be tested through the
methodology developed to evaluate the
development level of the market. The first is
that bond market underdevelopment is
related to financial fragility. For the sake of this
evaluation the concept of Financial fragility
will be later defined and a Financial Fragility
Index (FFI) will be presented to measure this
issue. The second hypothesis is that bond
market development needs a proper legal
and institutional framework; the main
characteristics of this framework will be later
presented to construct the Legal and
Institutional Framework Index (LIFI).
With both indicators defined, a general
classification of the level of development will be
designed/assigned in order to classify the
Uruguayan bond situation in different moments.
II.3.1. Financial Fragility Index (FFI)
For the purpose of this work, financial
fragility will be used in the two ways:
The first issue on fragility, in an open
economy, will reflect the inability of the country
to borrow abroad in its own currency9. The
Original Sin Index measures this issue as follows:
OSINi = max (1 – Securities in currency i /
Securities issued by country i , 0)
The second issue on fragility is the short-
term maturity of the bond market as a measure
of potentially destabilizing expectations. This
maturity index will assign a number between
1, for average maturities lower than 1 year, and
0, for average maturities of 20 years or more.
8 See Uruguayans spread explained A. Díaz and C. Graziani
in Why so high? P. Brock and Lilian Rojas-Suaráz (eds.), IDB
(2000). 9 As stated by Eichengreen, Hausmann and Panizza (2003).
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FFI will be calculated as an average of the
Original Sin Index and the maturity index. A
higher FFI will show a great fragility for bond
market and will be taken as an underdevelop-
ment sign.
II.3.2. Legal and Institutional Framework Index
(LIFI)
The Legal and institutional framework index
will focus on two structural aspects that
promote and improve market development:
First, a regulation index will assign a number
between 1 and 0. 1 will be assigned for lack of
regulation and supervision power for punish-
ment. 0 will be assigned to regimes that clearly
establish rules and punishment power.
Second, a bankruptcy index will evaluate the
existence of a bankruptcy law and legal
solution processes to market fails. It will assign
1 when there is no legal rule or 0 when it’s well
defined.
To measure these main aspects IOSCO10
principles will be applied to the Uruguayan
market.
LIFI will be calculated as an average of
regulation index and bankruptcy index. A
higher LIFI will show a lack of legal and
institutional framework for bond market
development and will be a signal of market
weakness.
II.3.3. Market classification on FFI and LIFI
Both global index, FFI and LIFI, will be
calculated in three different periods to show
changes in market development. Its results will
be crossed to classify the market situation in
«development zones» defined as follows.
Table 1 shows the classification of bond
market to understand the level of development
achieved and the risk involved in each
situation. On the one hand, the underdevelop-
ment zone implies both, high financial fragility,
and a poor legal and institutional framework.
On the other hand, the development zone
shows a stronger financial market with disabled
characteristics and a proper legal environment.
The other two zones show which is the main
risk in bond market operation.
Table 1. Market development classification
10 International Organization of Securities Commissions.
Fragility Risk
Zone
Development
Zone
Underdevelopment
Zone
Legal and Institutional
Risk Zone
FFI
1
0,5
0 0,5 1
LIFI
This classification will show what types of
risks were present in each market and possible
solutions for them.
III.Measuring the Level of
Development of Uruguayan Bond
Market
In the Uruguayan case we will point out
three outstanding periods.
III.1. Before 1995
This period is marked by an expansion in
the economy (after the 80’s crisis and several
fiscal adjustments in the early nineties) but
there is still no strong legal framework and
control for bond market development.
Financial Fragility Index (FFI): By the end of
1994, the Original Sin Index is 0.98 because the
greatest portion of Uruguayan securities was
issued in US dollars. There is little difference
between private and public bonds in this issue,
because of the high dollarization of the
economy.
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The average maturity of both private and
public bonds was 6 years, so the maturity index
is 0.75 and the total Financial Fragility Index is
0.87. This shows that bond market was unable
to allow corporate financial alternatives in local
currency and to give investors greater maturity
options.
Legal and Institutional Framework Index
(LIFI): As it was stated before, by the end of 1994
there were no regulation requirements for
stock markets to work. The Montevideo Stock
Exchange (MSE), works from the early 20th
century and in 1994, banks created the
Electronic Stock Exchange. If self-regulation
existed, it was no controlled by the govern-
ment, and then the regulation index is 1. The
same happened with bankruptcy law and legal
solution processes that generally had particular
agreements because of long-lasting legal
processes. Because of it, Legal and Institutional
Framework Index (LIFI) is 1 by the end of 1994.
Crossing both index results, the Uruguayan
bond market clearly falls in the Underdevelop-
ment Zone (see Table 2).
III.2. After 1995
There were several changes by the end of
1995. First, the relevance of the new capital
market law that changed the general regulation
and control of capital markets. Second, its
implications to the evolution of private bonds
through the so called «Caso Moro»11. The failure
of this firm on the bond market shows other
underdevelopment indicators: accounting
standards, well professional procedures and
legal problems. Finally, the 1995 pension reform
creates a multipillar regime with a funded
pension scheme on the second pillar. These
funds have changed drastically the domestic
market dynamics by becoming one of the
biggest institutional investors of the country (in
2004 total funds were more than 10% of GDP).
This change could be seen as a necessary
condition for market development, but it is not
enough. Its consequences over market operation,
bond prices and rating information will show
the positive and negative aspects of this
important event.
Financial Fragility Index (FFI): By the end of
1998, the Original Sin Index is 0.97 because still
the greatest portion of Uruguayan securities
was issued in US dollars. The average maturity
of both private and public bonds was 9 years,
so the maturity index is 0.60 and the total
Financial Fragility Index is 0.79. This shows that
dollarization and lack of confidence were still
part of the general situation after 1995.
Legal and Institutional Framework Index
(LIFI): In 1996 a new Capital Market Law was
promulgated12, and the Central Bank took
control over market institutions. By checking
IOSCO principles over regulation and
supervision 15 of the 30 principles have total
or partial implementation so the regulation
index is 0.5. The new law didn’t change the
main aspect related to bankruptcy and legal
solution processes, so the bankruptcy index
remains 1. In the average the Legal and
Institutional Framework Index (LIFI) is 0.75 by
the end of 1998.
Crossing both index results, the Uruguayan
bond market improves its situation from 1994,
but still falls in the Underdevelopment Zone
(see Table 2).
A special issue is the differences between
private and public debt, because the private
debt situation was improved by the new capital
market law, but the lack of regulation on
bankruptcy and some market problems, like
that of Moro Farm, stopped its development,
leaving financial assistance in banks hands
again.
11 In reference to the bond issues by Moro Farm, that fails in
1998 after an important issuance and having given false in-
formation to the market. 12 Law 16.749.
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III.3. After 2002
The 2002 crisis led to a public debt
restructure in May 2003. This episode shows the
importance of the macroeconomic environ-
ment for bond market development.
Since the 2002 crisis, bank credit has hardly
diminished. Firms have been looking for bond
market financing, but only a few projects have
successfully found its market solution. Did
investors require harder conditions after the
crisis? Are financial instruments right for firms’
needs? These two questions are directly
engaged with bond market underdevelop-
ment. Even new debt has been issued in local
currency, still the Original Sin Index remains
high and the rest of the 1998’s situation is the
same.
Within this environment, the promotion of
private bond market is still a problem waiting
for solutions. One alternative to the current
situation may be the promotion of a regional
bond market. MERCOSUR13 has been working in
several agreements for cross border operations
that still did not achieve any political resolution.
This common market can be thought as a
solution for market size problem as a step
towards global integration.
Table 2. Uruguayan bond market
development classification
IV. What should be done to
promote bond markets?
The main results show that even though the
Uruguayan bond market has improved its
situation over the last ten years; it still remains
in the underdevelopment zone.
The methodology developed in this paper
shows the fragilities and legal framework to be
improved in order to promote the Uruguayan
bond market.
Four areas should be promoted:
a. Market instruments: After the 2002 crisis,
the creation of the Indexed Unit (IU) – as
a part of the reversal of the dollarization
process – and the lack of bank credits are
perceived as new chances to develop
market instruments.
b. Market structure: rethinking of market
functions through the promotion of the
right instrument for every kind of
financial needs and improving market
institutions like clearance and settle-
ments organizations.
c. Legal system: create an adequate frame for
market operations, especially on bank-
ruptcy law and contracts, establishing
clear rights for bond holders and proper
procedures on firms’ restructuring.
d. Regional integration: as a part of the
integration process, bond market
integration can be a solution for market
development. Its promotion and
improvement will be a challenge to
manage in the near future.
These four areas are not isolated, they are
part of the same problem, and therefore the
improvement in one of them will promote
changes in the others, encouraging Latin
American market development.
13 The South Common Market Union (Mercado Común del
Sur) is a commercial union which tends to consolidate as an
economic union.
1994
2002
Fragility Risk
Zone
Development
Zone
Underdevelopment
Zone
Legal and Institutional
Risk Zone
FFI
1
0,5
0 0,5 1
LIFI
1998
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